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abStRact
Due to a variety of natural causes, suffering predominates over well-being in the lives of wild 
animals. From an antispeciesist standpoint that considers the interests of all sentient indi-
viduals, we should intervene in nature to benefit these animals, provided that the expectable 
result is net positive. However, according to the environmentalist view the aim of benefiting 
wild animals cannot justify intervening in nature. In addition, harmful human interventions 
can sometimes be justified. This view assumes that (i) certain entities such as ecosystems or 
species have intrinsic value, and that (ii) at least sometimes these values are more important 
than nonhuman well-being. In this article I review the arguments in support of this view 
advanced by three prominent environmentalists (Albert Schweitzer, Paul W. Taylor and 
J. Baird Callicott) and show how none of them succeed at grounding these assumptions.
Keywords: animal ethics, antispeciesism, environmentalism, biocentrism, ecocen-
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natural harms.
Human beings have the capacity to intervene in nature. That is, they can 
interfere with natural processes or change ecosystems, thereby altering the 
course of events that would otherwise develop if human action would not 
have taken place. Given this capacity to intervene, the question arises of 
whether this interference is morally justified and, if so, under which cir-
cumstances it should occur or which goals it must pursue.
Regarding this problem, there is a fundamental discrepancy between 
different views. In this article, I will assess two wide sets of these. On the 
one hand, those who claim that it is justified to intervene in nature to help 
animals that live in the wild (section 1). On the other hand, those who, 
assuming environmentalist perspectives, deny that such justification 
obtains. In addition, they claim that in certain occasions it is justified to 
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intervene in nature when doing so would cause harm to the animals that 
live there (section 2). 
Environmentalist views asume two different theses: an axiological 
thesis and a thesis about our balance of reasons. I will show that none of the 
arguments used by three prominent environmentalists – Albert Schweitzer, 
Paul W. Taylor and J. Baird Callicott – succeed in justifying the axiological 
thesis (section 3). Next, I will argue that given its implications for human 
beings, the thesis about the balance of reasons is also unacceptable (sec-
tion 4). I will conclude that the environmentalist view should be abandoned 
and that the antispeciesist view is right in claiming that we should intervene 
in nature to help the animals that inhabit it. 
1. the antiSpecieSiSt view:
 inteRventionS that benefit animalS in the wild
According to several authors (see, e.g., Sapontzis 1984; Ng 1995; Cowen 
2003; Nussbaum 2006; Horta 2010a; McMahan 2010; Tomasik 2014), one 
of the aims that would justify intervening in nature is helping nonhuman 
animals that live there. Such help could consist in preventing them from suf-
fering a natural harm or in alleviating it when its occurrence is unavoidable. 
It could also consist in providing animals with some other benefit, thereby 
making their lives better. Thus, these would be positive interventions for 
animals in the wild. In fact, contrary to what is often believed, the lives of 
animals that live in the wild are far from being idyllic. As it is pointed out in 
other papers of this volume (e.g., Faria, Horta; and also Horta 2010a), ani-
mals that live in the wild are subjected to a variety of serious and systematic 
harms which cause most of them to lead short lives full of suffering. 
It is true that there are certain natural processes that harm nonhuman 
animals and regarding which we currently lack the means to intervene 
effectively. This would be the case of the reproductive strategy followed 
by the majority of animals (“r-selection”), which maximises the chances of 
survival by increasing the number of offspring while investing a very small 
amount of parental care. Since, on average, only one individual per parent 
survives, it follows that most individuals die soon after birth. Usually, they 
die in painful ways, without having experienced any positive well-being 
during their entire lives.
In addition, the individuals that survive to adulthood are also exposed 
to a wide range of natural harms on a daily basis, such as starvation and 
dehydration, diseases and parasitism or injuries caused by other animals. 
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Even though we cannot presently intervene to alleviate these harms on a 
large scale, we do have the means to do it at a medium or small scale. As 
a matter of fact, it is possible to help (it is already done) some of these 
animals in need. For example, by providing them with water and food or 
curing them of injuries and diseases. 
From the rejection of speciesism it follows that the aim of helping ani-
mals in nature and who are in need justifies intervening in natural processes 
or altering ecosystems. Speciesism, in its anthropocentric version, is a kind 
of discrimination which consists in disfavouring the interests of certain 
individuals on the grounds that they do not belong to the human species 
(Horta 2010b; Faria and Paez 2014). 
The majority of wild animals are, like most humans, sentient beings. 
That is, they are individuals with the capacity to suffer and enjoy what hap-
pens in their lives. Thus, they have a well-being of their own. Many of us 
would not resist the claim that we would have decisive reasons to intervene 
in nature if the individuals in need were human beings. In fact, this is what 
we commonly do, for example, in those cases in which humans are victims 
of natural disasters. 
Since speciesism must be rejected (e.g., Pluhar 1995; Dunayer 2004; 
Horta 2010b), our attitude regarding the situation of wild animals in need 
should be the same as when human beings are in similar circumstances. 
Thus, from a moral view which takes the interests of all sentient animals 
into account (human or nonhuman), we have decisive reasons to intervene 
in nature in order to benefit the animals that live there, whenever we can 
do it and provided that our intervention is not expected to cause more suf-
fering than the one it aims at reducing.
2. the enviRonmentaliSt view: between non-inteRvention 
 and negative inteRvention
Environmentalist positions endorse a view which is contrary to the one just 
discussed. They claim that the aim of helping animals in nature does not 
gives us reasons – or, at least, it does not give us even sufficient reasons – to 
intervene. We could thus define this position about intervention in nature 
as the one according to which pursuing certain environmentalist aims (such 
as the preservation of species or ecosystems or not interfering with natural 
processes) can justify inflicting harms on sentient nonhuman animals (nega-
tive intervention) as well as failing to prevent them from experience some 
harm (not carrying out a positive intervention).
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We can analyze the environmentalist position about intervention in 
nature as a conjunction of two different theses:
(a) an axiological thesis about the kind of things which are intrinsically 
valuable, and
(b) a thesis about the result of the balance of reasons when intrinsically valu-
able entities are affected. 
Regarding the axiological thesis, it is necessary to clarify in what sense 
the preservation of species or of ecosystems or the non-interference in nat-
ural processes are, according to environmentalism, morally relevant aims. 
These aims are promoted by environmentalism not because they might be 
good for human beings. If that were the case, we would be facing a purely 
anthropocentric theory. That is, bringing about these aims would only be 
an instrument to achieve the ultimately valuable aim – the satisfaction of 
human interests. It is not the case either that environmentalism defends 
(as it is usually believed) that we should preserve species or ecosystems, or 
abstaining from interfering with natural processes, because that is good for 
the animals that live in the wild. As we have seen, given the predominance 
of suffering in nature, concern for the interests of nonhuman individu-
als does not justify non-intervention. On the contrary, it implies that we 
should intervene in order to help them. 
For environmentalism, the preservation of species or ecosystems, or 
not interfering with the course of natural processes, are ultimate aims and 
not the means for achieving some further aim. This is so because, according 
to this perspective, the existence of these entities or the natural course of 
these processes is intrinsically valuable and not merely valuable to obtain 
other outcomes, such as the promotion of the well-being of sentient indi-
viduals.
That does not entail that environmentalism is incompatible with the 
belief that the well-being of sentient individuals is intrinsically valuable. 
Now regarding the thesis of the balance of reasons, it does entail that if we 
consider the promotion of well-being to be a morally relevant aim, that will 
be subordinate to other typical environmentalist aims. 
One the one hand, intervention in nature to help wild animals always 
presupposes an unjustified interference with natural processes. This gives 
us reasons against intervening. If we endorse an environmentalist theory, 
either these are our only reasons to act or these reasons are always stronger 
than the reasons given by the benefit generated by intervention for nonhu-
man animals in need. 
On the other hand, often, respecting or promoting what environmental-
ism regards as intrinsically valuable requires, alternatively, carrying out cer-
tain interventions in ecosystems with the aim of restoring them to a former 
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state, previous to human intervention. These kind of interventions which 
further environmentalist aims are defended even when they cause great 
harm to the animals that live in nature. This happens, for example, when 
environmentalists support the so-called “ecology of fear”, that is, promoting 
certain biotic relations between predators and prey in order to accomplish 
certain conservationist aims (Horta 2010d; Faria 2012). The aim is achieved 
through the reintroduction of predator species in ecosystems where they 
had long been absent, which implies a great suffering for the animals that 
are taken as prey.
In what follows, I will criticize both the axiological thesis and the thesis 
of the balance of reasons implied by environmentalism. My aim is to show 
that we have reasons to reject them and, with them, the whole environmen-
talist view about intervention in nature. 
3. objecting to the axiological theSiS
 of the enviRonmentaliSt view
The axiological thesis of a moral theory refers to what it considers to be 
valuable as an end, as opposed to what is valuable in a merely derived way, 
as a means to achieve what is considered ultimately valuable. Different ver-
sions of the environmentalist view defend different axiological theses. The 
importance of the axiological thesis for these different versions of environ-
mentalism resides in that these theories directly derive our moral reasons 
from what they consider intrinsically valuable. If we discovered that we 
may refuse to accept these axiologies or, even, that we must reject them, it 
would follow that we may also refuse to accept the reasons against positive 
interventions (and for negative interventions) that these different versions 
of environmentalism derive from them.
It is plausible to claim that any axiology should include, at least, aspects 
of the well-being of sentient individuals, e.g., how much well-being exists 
in a state of affairs or how it is distributed. This follows from accepting 
the moral importance of our own well-being, and from recognising that 
the failure to attribute a similar importance to the well-being of other indi-
viduals can only be the product of an arbitrary restriction. We may use this 
to ground different normative positions. For example, it could be claimed 
that, among different alternative courses of action, we must choose the one 
that produces, on aggregate, greater net positive well-being. If, in addition, 
equality was included in our axiology, we should also take into account 
how well-being is distributed among the affected individuals in order to 
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identify the best alternative. That is, at least one of the things that should 
morally matter to us in an ultimate sense is how well or badly the life of 
sentients individuals fares and how they can be positively or negatively 
affected by our actions or omissions.
To the extent that elements distinct from well-being are introduced in 
an axiology, the possibility arises that what we ought morally to do does 
not coincide with what is the best in terms of the aggregation – or of the 
distribution – of well-being for the sentient individuals affected by our 
decisions. That is to say that the reasons derived from those other values 
distinct from well-being may come to justify not to benefit an individual 
or inflicting her some harm, even if the opposite is what would be morally 
required solely in terms of well-being.
One may, thus, wonder, what arguments exist for the inclusion of ele-
ments distinct from well-being in our axiology. Hence, defenders of the 
axiological thesis must show:
(a) in general, that it makes sense for something distinct from well-being to 
have intrinsic value;
(b) in particular, that entities such as species or ecosystems have intrinsic 
value.
In what follows I will assess three different axiological theories, each 
from a different environmentalist author, as well as the normative positions 
that can be derived from them.
3.1. Albert Schweitzer: reverence for life
Albert Schweitzer (1994) claims that all living organisms possess a will to 
live. This will to live consists in:
(a) the preference for continuing to live rather than ceasing to exist that all 
organisms have, and
(b) the desires to experience pleasure and not to experience suffering of all 
organisms.
According to Schweitzer, all lives with a will to live are intrinsically 
valuable and they are so to the same degree. If follows from this that 
human beings have the obligation to procure the satisfaction, and prevent 
the frustration, of the desires that constitute a will to live. Likewise, this 
is an obligation we have regarding all living organisms (since all harbour 
these desires) and that is equally stringent regarding all of them (since all 
are valuable to the same degree).
This would explain why organisms have intrinsic value. Now, it would 
also allow us to account for the intrinsic value of species and ecosystems. 
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To the extent that living organisms are members of species and ecosystems, 
the intrinsic value of the latter is a function of the intrinsic value of their 
members.
As we have seen, Schweitzer characterises the will to live in terms of 
mental states, that is, in terms of desires. If this characterisation is under-
stood in a strict sense, then it is false that all living organisms have a will 
to live. This is because not all living organisms possess a capacity to have 
mental states and, therefore, not all of them can entertain the desires in 
which this will consists. Only sentient individuals can, for instance, desire 
to experience pleasure or desire not to experience suffering. This way of 
construing Schweitzer’s thesis is indistinguishable from an axiology which 
claims that what matters is the well-being of individuals, and which believes 
that what contributes to individual well-being is the satisfaction of desires, 
whereas what detracts from it is their frustration. But one cannot derive 
reasons against interventions beneficial to the animals that live in nature, 
or reasons for negative interventions, from this construal of Schweitzer’s 
view. Similarly to what happens with what I name the antispeciesist view, 
we are worried about the well-being of all sentient individuals. This entails, 
again, that we have decisive reasons to intervene in nature in order to help 
the sentient nonhumans that live there, whenever we can, and when the 
expected result of our intervention is, in the overall, beneficial for them.
Now we may understand Schweitzer’s characterisation of the will to 
live in terms of “desires” as merely figurative. Certainly, over time, those 
traits of living organisms have been selected which improved their chances 
of survival until reproduction. This makes them respond to their environ-
ment in a favourable way regarding some stimuli and in an aversive way 
regarding others, whether they possess or not a capacity to have mental 
states. This renders intelligible the claim that in a loose sense all organisms 
“desire” to live, or “desire” to avoid what will harm them. This is the same 
sense in which we may claim that a river “desires” to flow into the sea. But 
this is a different sense from the one that implies that there is some indi-
vidual who possesses certain mental states the frustration or satisfaction of 
which will have an impact on her well-being. As we have seen, this is only 
true of sentient individuals. Given the figurative sense in which, under this 
construal, the term “desire” would be employed, it is mysterious how the 
will to live might be intrinsically valuable.
Thus, we either understand the will to live to be characterised by a 
figurative use of “desire”, or we understand that this term is employed in a 
strict sense. In the first case, we can attribute intrinsic value to species and 
ecosystems, as a function of the intrinsic value of the organisms that are 
their members. However, there is no consideration whatsoever supporting 
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the notion that the possession of such “desires” renders an organism intrin-
sically valuable, nor, therefore, that species or ecosystems are valuable in 
that way as well.
In the second case, such considerations do exist, though only regarding 
sentient individuals, since only they can entertain desires in the strict sense 
which is relevant for well-being. Nevertheless, such a view cannot claim 
that species or ecosystems have intrinsic value, but only that they have 
instrumental value: they are valuable or disvaluable insofar as they contrib-
ute in a positive or negative way to the well-being of the individuals that are 
a part of them. Given the predominance of suffering in nature, regarding 
ecosystems that instrumental value is overwhelmingly negative.
3.2. Paul W. Taylor: respect for nature
According to Taylor (1986) all entities with a good, or well-being, of their 
own have an intrinsic value that must be respected (or using his own 
phrase, they have an inherent worth)  1. On the one hand, the fact that an 
entity has a well-being of its own implies that it can be benefited or harmed 
by what happens to it. On the other hand, the fact that its intrinsic value 
must be respected implies that we have reasons not to harm entities with a 
well-being of their own and not to interfere with their activities.
According to this author, organisms are the kind of entity that pos-
sesses a well-being if its own, since what happens to them can be good 
or bad for them (1986, 61-2). In fact, organisms are the primary bearers 
of well-being (71). What is good for an organism, Taylor claims, from the 
organism’s own perspective, is what promotes the aims to which its internal 
processes and external activities are oriented. Contrariwise, what is bad for 
an organism, from its own perspective, is what frustrates such aims. Exam-
ples of such processes would be the adaptation to the environment, the 
preservation of the organism’s existence or the perpetuation of its species. 
Thus, an organism possesses a high level of well-being, from the organism’s 
own perspective, when it has successfully adapted to its environment and 
when it has developed the normal biological functions before dying (66-8). 
 1 Certainly, Taylor uses the phrase “inherent worth” (75). However, with this term 
he refers to a kind of value which is similar to the one I refer to by “intrinsic value”: that 
which is valued as an end, and not merely as a means. It so happens, though, that this 
author distinguishes between what is valuable as an end independently of the existence of 
a conscious individual that values it so (inherent worth), from what is valuable in this way 
only because there is an individual who judges it to be so (the varieties of intrinsic value 
and inherent value, 73-4).
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In this way, we have moral reasons not to harm organisms and to avoid 
interfering in their activities (72).
Although, as I said, organisms are the primary bearers of well-being 
(or those who bear well-being in a non-derivative way), they are not the 
only entities of which it can be predicated. Organisms constitute popula-
tions or communities that, since they are groupings of primary bearers of 
well-being, are also derivative bearers of it. This implies that we also have 
reasons not to harm groupings of organisms, such as species or ecosystems, 
and to avoid interfering in their activities.
Now, Taylor’s view rests on the thesis that there is something like an 
organism’s own perspective, according to which an event can be good or bad 
for it. Strictly speaking, though, this is false of organism’s in general: there 
is no such thing as the perspective of a non-sentient organism. Because it 
lacks a subjective point of view, and a capacity for affective mental states, it 
is not possible for an event in the world to cause it to have experiences of 
enjoyment or suffering. In a similar way, it is also impossible, strictly speak-
ing, that it establishes for itself aims that are the contents of desires that 
can be frustrated or satisfied. Certainly, as was also true in our discussion 
of Schweitzer, we can speak about an organism’s perspective in a figurative 
way. In that case, our attribution of “aims” to non-sentient organisms (or to 
the non-conscious processes of organisms) would be, like before, a short-
cut to refer to the fact that given the conditions in which individuals’ traits 
have been selected for over time, these have developed a set of survival and 
reproduction mechanisms. It would then be true that all organisms have a 
“well-being” in that sense.
Non-sentient organisms, thus, only possess “well-being” in the second, 
figurative sense, but not in a strict sense. Sentient organisms, for their part, 
possess well-being in both senses. This is problematic. As it was suggested 
above, it would be implausible to claim that individuals’ well-being, strictly 
speaking, is not valuable and that, therefore – assuming a normative stance 
which is common to all the authors that are here being discussed – we 
do not have reasons to promote it. If, furthermore, we believe that “well-
being” in Taylor’s figurative sense is valuable as well, we will also derive 
from that fact reasons to promote it. The problem is that the maximisation 
of well-being in Taylor’s sense is conceptually distinct from the maximisa-
tion of well-being in a strict sense. The aims of adapting to the environment 
and realisation of reproductive functions before death are logically inde-
pendent from the promotion of the well-being of an individual. In addition, 
in our world, these are incompatible aims. What on aggregate maximises 
adaptation to the environment and reproductive success are precisely natu-
ral processes responsible for the predominance of suffering in nature.
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Let us assume for the sake of the argument that “well-being” in Tay-
lor’s figurative sense has normative importance. Since regarding sentient 
organisms each one of these two considerations (well-being in a strict sense 
and well-being in a figurative sense) would give us moral reasons pointing 
to opposite directions, we must determine which is morally weightier. To 
that end, we can think about which one we believe that ought to prevail in 
case that the living organisms at issue were human beings. We would either 
claim that well-being in a subjective sense always prevails over well-being 
in Taylor’s sense, or that the latter lacks any normative relevance.
Unless we are speciesist, we must extend this conclusion to those cases 
in which what we are considering is the situation of nonhuman sentient 
individuals. These are precisely the cases in which we are considering 
whether to help the animals that live in nature. Even if it were true that 
the best we could do is to let nature follow its course, because that is what 
would maximise on aggregate the “well-being” of organisms in Taylor’s 
sense, that is incompatible with what is best for the well-being, in a strict 
sense, of sentient individuals. In this way, we would still have decisive rea-
sons to intervene in nature with the aim of helping them, and whenever 
the expected result is net positive. The alleged reasons against doing so 
based on the intrinsic value of organisms, or of groupings of organisms like 
species or ecosystems, are either always weaker than those based on the 
well-being of individuals in a strict sense, or non-existent.
3.3. J. Baird Callicott: the inherent value of biotic communities 
Until now, I have employed the term “intrinsic value” to refer to the value 
which something has as an end, as opposed to the value it can have as a 
means to obtain further things which are indeed valued as ends. In his 
work, however, Callicott prefers to speak of “inherent value” to refer to an 
axiological category with identical normative implications  2.
Callicott starts with the observation that human beings possess an 
affective constitution with a capacity for such moral feelings as sympathy, 
loyalty or patriotism. Given our affective constitution, there are certain 
objects which arouse those feelings, thus becoming recipients of inherent 
value. Through the process of natural selection, this constitution of affec-
 2 Actually, Callicott distinguishes between “intrinsic value” and “inherent value”. 
Though both refer to the evaluation of something as an end, the first is “objetive and 
independent of all valuing consciousness” (1989, 161), whereas the second “is not inde-
pendent of all valuing consciousness” (ibid.). With respect to my argument, however, this 
distinction is inconsequential.
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tions has been standardised among all members of the human species, pro-
ducing a “consensus of feelings” (1989, 164). It is possible that we fail to 
attribute inherent value to some entities not because they are unfit objects 
of value, but simply because of an epistemic mistake: we ignore that they 
possess certain attributes, possessed as well by the entities we consider to 
be inherently valuable, and which are precisely the ones that make them 
proper objects of valuation. Whenever this happens, what we must do, for 
the sake of consistency, is to include them in the set of entities to which we 
give inherent value. Thus, for instance, in the beginning we valued in an 
inherent way those human beings that belonged to our community. After 
discovering that other human beings, given the properties which they share 
with the members of our community, are also proper objects of our moral 
feelings, the right thing to do is to also attribute inherent value to them.
According to Callicott, if we reason from the facts about which ecol-
ogy informs us, we must recognise that other entities are also the proper 
objects of our moral feelings (1989, 162-3). In the first place, nonhuman 
natural entities, insofar as members, just like human beings, of the same 
biotic community, are the proper object of the feelings of sympathy or 
benevolence. In the second place, nature as a whole, insofar as the great 
biotic community to which we belong, is the proper object of the moral 
feeling of loyalty.
This argument for the extension of our moral feelings from other 
human beings to biotic communities and their members assumes that the 
latter share with the former the properties which are relevant with regard to 
those feelings. Certainly, other sentient beings (be they human or not) are 
proper objects of feelings such as sympathy or benevolence because they 
have a well-being of their own. In this way, they have the capacity to suffer 
and to enjoy what happens in their lives, so that they can be positively and 
negatively affected by our actions. What is morally appropriate is to have 
favourable disposition towards what is good for them and a contrary one 
towards what is detrimental for them. Similarly, communities of sentient 
beings (be they human or not) can be proper objects of feelings such as loy-
alty. Actions that have consequences on the community as a whole or a part 
of it can have a positive or negative impact on the sentient individuals who 
are their members. A disposition such as loyalty can be useful insofar as it 
moves us to act, with respect to the community, in the ways that benefit to 
the greatest extent those that compose it.
However, none of that is true of non-sentient entities and the com-
munities we may consider them to compose. This is because they cannot 
be benefited or harmed by our actions, since these are entities that lack a 
capacity to be positively or negatively affected by what happens to them. 
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Due to all that, it does not follow, contrary to Callicott, that biotic commu-
nities (and, hence, species or ecosystems) and their non-sentient members 
are proper objects of our moral feelings and that, therefore, we must also 
consider them as inherently valuable.
4. objecting to the theSiS of the balance of ReaSonS
It follows from the analysis in the previous section that none of the authors 
discussed manages to develop a plausible argument for the intrinsic (or 
inherent) value of species or ecosystems. Under the assumption that no 
other argument, different from those presented here, would be persuasive, 
we can conclude that we have no reasons to include these entities as basic 
elements in our axiology.
It is, indeed, possible to object that such an assumption may prove 
to be unjustified. Now even in that case, that would not be sufficient to 
support the environmentalist view against positive interventions and for 
negative interventions in nature. Additionally, it is necessary for a further 
thesis, independent to these axiologies, to be also justified – the thesis of 
the balance of reasons:
Thesis of the balance: at least on some occasions, the reasons derived from 
the value of species or ecosystems are stronger than the reasons derived from 
what is better for the sentient beings who would be affected by our decision. 
In these cases, it would be justified to choose an alternative that is worse for 
those sentient beings because it is the best one for the affected species or 
ecosystems.
Given that speciesism is an unjustified prejudice, the thesis of the balance 
must hold whatever the species of the sentient beings affected by our deci-
sion, that is, be they human or nonhuman. For all those cases regarding 
which we believe that the intrinsic value of species or ecosystems gives us 
decisive reasons against helping nonhumans living in nature we could find 
analogous cases in which the individuals in need are human beings.
Rejecting speciesism and accepting the thesis of the balance leads 
us to conclude that in none of those cases such individuals ought to be 
helped. This is clearly unacceptable regarding the cases in which those who 
need our intervention are human beings. Since our treatment of nonhu-
man interests in a similar situation must be the same, the implications that 
accepting the thesis of the balance would have for them should also seem 
to us unacceptable. Our only alternative is, then, to reject as well the thesis 
of the balance.
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5. concluSion
The environmentalist view, as defined in this paper, claims that the preser-
vation of certain natural entities (such as species or ecosystems) or the non-
interference with natural processes can justify both inflicting some harm to 
sentient nonhuman animals (negative intervention) and failing to prevent 
them from suffering some harm (not carrying out a positive intervention).
However, if my argument is sound, then the environmentalist position 
is not justified. Firstly, we do not have reasons to accept an axiology which, 
along with the well-being of sentient individuals, incorporates other entities 
as intrinsically valuable. Secondly, even if we accepted such an axiology, 
we should reject the thesis that, after the balance of reasons, the reasons 
given by the value of these entities might be stronger than the reasons given 
by the well-being of sentient individuals. Thus, the mere aim of preserv-
ing species or ecosystems or of avoiding interfering with natural processes 
(a) cannot even give us sufficient reasons to inflict some harm to sentient 
individuals and (b) cannot even give us sufficient reasons against prevent-
ing them from suffering some harm or against mitigating some harm they 
will suffer. 
Now from an antispeciesist view, which takes the interests of all sen-
tient animals into account, whether they are human or not, what matters 
most is how their well-being is affected by our actions and omissions. It fol-
lows from this view that we have decisive reasons against performing nega-
tive interventions in nature (those with an expected net negative value for 
nonhuman animals). Similarly, it implies that, whenever it is in our power 
to do so, and if the intervention is expected to bring about more benefits 
than harms, we have decisive reasons to intervene in nature with the aim of 
helping the animals that live there. 
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